We provide evidence on the sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) by examining how often individual professional forecasters revise their forecasts. We draw interest rate and unemployment rate forecasts from the monthly Wall Street Journal surveys.
Introduction
How economic agents process information to form expectations continues to be a central issue in macroeconomics. Recent work proposes alternatives to the full information, rational expectations model that presumes agents form expectations from complete information and revise them when relevant new information appears. Woodford (2003) relaxes the full information assumption to develop a model in which agents extract signals from noisy information (the noisy-information model). Sims (2003) considers limits to information processing which lead rational agents to form expectations from incomplete information (the rational-inattention model). Reis (2006) and Mankiw and Reis (2002) posit significant costs of acquiring and processing information that deter agents from updating their information sets and revising their expectations every time new information arrives (the sticky-information model).
The sticky-information model has received empirical support from Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) , who examine indirectly the frequency with which professional forecasters revise their forecasts. Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers first simulate inflation forecasts of agents who asynchronously collect information and revise their forecasts using a sticky-information model. They then compare dispersion in the simulated forecasts to dispersion in the actual forecasts of professional forecasters (consumers) and find that the simulated series mirrors the actual series most closely when the agents revise their inflation expectations about every 10 months (12.5 months).
1 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) assume that professional forecasters make full information, rational expectations forecasts but that costs prevent some from revising their forecasts every period. They estimate the frequency of forecast revision by regressing the average forecast error for a specific horizon on 1 Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) use the Livingston Survey for professional forecasts and the Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior for consumer expectations. Like Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers, Carroll (2003) also finds that households revise their expectations about once a year, based partially on professional forecasts.
the revision of the average forecast. They conclude that forecasters revise their inflation forecasts once every 6 to 7 months, on average.
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Later work investigates the sticky-information model using more direct methods. Andrade and LeBihan (2013) measure the fraction of forecasters revising their forecasts each quarter in the European Survey of Professional Forecasters. They find that, on average, forecasters update their inflation forecasts about every 4 months, more frequently than found by Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) . 3 Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) examine numbers of households revising their inflation forecasts in the Michigan Survey.
They find that households are more likely to revise their expectations the more newspaper reports about inflation have appeared recently. Dovern et al. (2015) examine monthly GDP forecasts by individual professional forecasters in thirty-six countries assembled by Consensus
Economics and find that forecasters revise their forecasts about every three months. These findings challenge the sticky-information model (Coibion, 2015) .
In this paper, we produce new evidence on the sticky-information model by studying monthly forecasts of three economic variables made one to twelve months ahead by individual, professional economists in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) Economic Forecasting Survey from 2003 to 2014. Our evidence is new because forecasts from the WSJ survey have not, to our knowledge, been used for this purpose. We begin by documenting properties of the economists' forecasts and forecast revision behavior. Then, we estimate models of their revision behavior to study how forecast horizon and economic changes affect the economists' propensities to revise 2 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) use the quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Mertens and Nason (2015) estimate a model similar to that of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) on forecasts of the GDP deflator from the SPF and find that forecasters reduced their revision frequency from about every 5 months in the 1970s to about every 7-8 months after 2000. 3 Andrade and LeBihan (2013) use the quarterly European Survey of Professional Forecasters. Armantier et al. (2016) conduct an experiment on how households revise their inflation expectations and find that 42-47 percent do not revise their expectations when given the opportunity.
forecasts. The dependent variable in our models is the fraction of forecasters not revising their forecasts since the last survey because it implies a revision frequency measure comparable to that of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) . We also examine whether the economists' revision behavior changed after the financial crisis. Finally, we investigate whether economists who revise their predictions forecast more accurately.
Our use of the WSJ surveys has two main advantages. First, the surveys are monthly, allowing forecasters to revise forecasts more frequently than possible with either the quarterly (US and European) Surveys of Professional Forecasters or the semi-annual Livingston Survey.
Second, the surveys identify each forecaster by name, allowing us to associate forecasters with their individual forecasts. Thus we can construct direct measures of forecast revision frequency and conduct direct tests of whether forecasts are state-independent and constant through time, as assumed by Coibion and Gorodnicheko (2015) .
Our study uses the WSJ economists' forecasts of three variables: the 10-year Treasury bond rate, the fed funds rate, and the unemployment rate. We choose these variables because they are rarely revised after being observed, avoiding ambiguity about whether forecasters intended to forecast initially reported or revised values of a variable. We also choose them because the WSJ survey asks for forecasts of the values of these variables on specific days or months rather than asking for forecast averages over rolling horizons, like many other surveys.
Compared with forecast averages, single-date values yield cleaner measures of revision frequency by avoiding revisions which correct for earlier forecast errors.
4
To preview our results, we find that substantial numbers of forecasters do not revise their forecasts of the three variables we study at every opportunity. The fraction of non-revisers varies 4 For example, if we are forecasting the average annual inflation rate for 2014 and we make our new forecast in, say, May 2014 after observing the actual monthly inflation rate for April 2014, we may change our forecast by replacing our previous expectation of the April 2014 inflation rate with the actual value. We would be classified as revising our forecast even if we did not change our expectations of monthly inflation for months from May to December.
with the variable forecasted. The fraction is also state dependent: forecasters are more likely to revise their forecasts of a variable the greater the change in that variable since the prior survey.
This finding is significant because indirect methods of studying revision frequency presume state-independent forecaster behavior. While we find that the WSJ forecasters do not revise their forecasts at every opportunity, we also find that the average time between revisions of bond rate and unemployment rate forecasts is about 1.5 months, less than one-half the time reported by most previous studies. 5 This casts some doubt on how well the sticky-information model can account for the persistence of macro-economic shocks. Additionally, we find that recently revised forecasts are not consistently more accurate than unrevised forecasts.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details our data. Section 3 describes our tests of the state dependency of forecast revision behavior and reports our results.
Section 4 presents extensions of our basic model. Section 5 concludes our paper. 5 Fed funds rate forecasts are revised about every three months, again faster than other studies. See footnote 14. 6 Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) report a similar finding. The inability of professional forecasters to forecast more accurately despite updating may support the noisy-information model. Dräger et al. (2016) Figure 1 plots the surveyed economists' 4-months-ahead forecasts of the 10-year bond rate, the fed funds rate, and the unemployment rate by target date. 10 Horizontal bars denote March 2003, the WSJ surveyed economists twice a year. For an analysis of the semi-annual forecasts, see Mitchell and Pearce (2007) . 8 Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2011, footnote 9) note that id numbers in the Survey of Professional Forecasters need not identify the same individuals over time. As a referee noted, following institutions might be preferable to following individuals if forecasts are made by institution-specific models without forecaster adjustments. 9 Survey results posted at the WSJ survey web site contain some apparent errors. In instances where a forecaster's prediction is substantially different from the prediction for the same target date in the preceding and succeeding surveys, we consider the prediction a probable transcription error. For example, one forecaster predicted that on December 31, 2008 the 10-year bond rate would be 3.88 % in the September survey, 1.27 % in the October survey and 3.68 % in the November survey. Appendix A in the Supporting Information lists the probable errors. We omit the questionable data points in the results reported here, but including them has little effect. 10 The 4-month horizon is representative of middle range forecasts. For comparison, we show 10-months-ahead and 2-months-ahead forecasts in Appendix B in the Supporting Information. We do not show 12-months-ahead and 1-month-ahead forecasts because they were not collected before 2008.
actual rates on the target dates. The plots show that the economists differ in their opinions, often substantially, as is typical for forecast surveys. 11 The sticky-information model explains differing opinions as differences in the dates on which economists updated their forecasts, an explanation which assumes economists make full-information, rational predictions whenever they update. In general, differences in forecasts may reflect differential access to information, differences in forecasting models, different loss functions, and/or differing prior beliefs (Manzan, 2011 The surveyed economists revised their fed funds rate forecasts less frequently than their bond rate or unemployment rate forecasts. For the fed funds rate forecasts, Nochange t averages about 0.65, implying a revision rate of no more than once every three months. If instead of predicting the actual fed funds rate the economists were predicting the fed funds rate target, this revision rate suggests they expected a target change at about every other meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which meets roughly twice every three months. The economists may, in fact, have been updating their information sets more frequently than their fed funds rate forecasts if new information was insufficient to predict a change in Fed policy.
The average revision rates we observe for economists in the WSJ survey forecasting the bond, fed funds and unemployment rates are greater than the revision rates Coibion and 13 Hotelling T 2 tests indicate that the average values of Nochange t are not significantly different for the three variables, with F(10,1) values of 2.81, .64, and 10.01 for the bond rate, unemployment rate, and fed funds rate, respectively. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) report that their measure of information rigidity does not appear to vary across forecast horizon. Gorodnichenko (2015) estimate for economists in the Survey of Professional Forecasters forecasting the inflation rate and other variables.
14 While the finding that substantial proportions of forecasters forgo revising their forecasts at every opportunity is consistent with the sticky information, the higher average revision rates we observe casts doubt on whether infrequently revised expectations can account for the persistent effects of shocks at a quarterly frequency. The foregoing evidence on forecast revision frequency is consistent with the notion that the costs of acquiring and processing information prevent forecasters from updating their forecasts whenever new information becomes available. Heterogeneity in revision behavior suggests that costs and/or benefits vary across forecasters. This evidence begs the question of whether forecast revision rate is independent of the size of recent changes in the variable being forecasted. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) assume in their framework that the revision rate is not state dependent, although they find evidence that more volatile periods exhibit less information stickiness. 16 We address this question in the next section.
3. Is the Degree of Information Stickiness State Dependent?
The Model
Empirically testing the state dependency of forecasters' forecast revision processes requires us to model changes in the information set for the economy. While we cannot measure all incoming information forecasters might access, we can measure one seemingly important piece of information: the amount of recent change in the variable a forecaster is predicting. In an efficient Treasury bond market, for example, bond rate changes since the last survey should be a good measure of new information which embeds itself in the current rate. Analogous arguments 15 We also investigated the role of employer type in forecast revision behavior. We defined ten employer types: commercial banks, investment banks, investment-advising firms, forecasting and research firms, insurance companies, other financial institutions (e.g., Fannie Mae), bond-rating firms, academia, professional associations, and nonfinancial institutions. Using a subsample of economists who responded to at least 25 surveys we computed the mean frequency of non-revision by employer type. Only economists at "other" financial institutions and bondrating firms have significantly different mean revision rates, revising their forecasts more frequently than economists at other employer types. They represent only about 5 percent of the WSJ economists, however. 16 Coibion and Gorodnicheko (2015) report evidence that forecasters revise less frequently during the Great Moderation. They note that "recessions, as periods of increased volatility, should be times when economic agents update and process information faster than in expansions since the (relative) cost of ignoring macroeconomic shocks in recession rises." (page 2674) can be made about changes in the funds rate and the unemployment rate. A practical advantage of representing changes in the information set by recent changes in the variables forecasted is that actual values of these variables are available to all economists at virtually no cost.
Some extreme examples illustrate the effect of information set changes on forecasts. We use the timing of the WSJ survey to define our change variables. While we observe neither the exact date an economist submits a forecast nor the most recent value of the forecasted variable he observed prior to submission, we do know that the WSJ assembles its surveys in the first or second week of each month. This fact leads us to compute the change in the actual bond rate, fed funds rate, and fed funds rate target from the last business day of the month before the prior survey to the last business day of the month before the current survey. Analogously, we compute the change in the unemployment rate as the difference in unemployment rates announced at the starts of the prior and current months.
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Our forecast revision model relates the fraction of economists not revising their forecasts of a variable (Nochange t ) to the absolute change in that variable in the prior month (bond rate, |∆i t-1 |; fed funds rate, |∆ffr t-1 |; or unemployment rate, |∆U t-1 |) and to the forecast horizon. We allow the horizon to have a nonlinear effect by including indicator variables for each horizon: 17 The Bureau of Labor Statistics announces the unemployment rate on the first Friday of a month for the previous month. Thus for example, we presume that economists submitting March 2010 unemployment rate forecasts for June 2010 have observed the change in the unemployment rate from January 2010 to February 2010. We use the announced unemployment rates in the real-time data set from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (see Croushore and Stark, 2001) to insure that survey participants had access to this information, since there are slight adjustments subsequent to the initial unemployment rate announcements.
( 1) where D jt is a zero-one indicator for forecast horizon of length j. 18 We expect larger values of |∆i t-1 |, |∆ffr t-1 |, and |∆U t-1 | to cause more economists to revise their forecasts, leading β to be negative. The signs of the γ j s are unclear: Figure 2 shows that the unconditional means of Nochange t may rise or fall as the target date grows more distant but differences in the unconditional means by horizon are not statistically significant, as noted earlier.
The design of the WSJ survey leads us to estimate equation (1) for two different sets of forecast horizons. At each survey, participants make shorter horizon (1-to 6-month-ahead) and longer horizon (7-to 12-month-ahead) forecasts of each variable. For example, the March survey reports bond rate, fed funds rate and unemployment rate forecasts the economists made at the start of March for the ends of June and December, four and ten months ahead, respectively.
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New information arriving between the February and March surveys may affect economists' June and December forecasts. Given this survey design, we estimate equation (1) separately on data for shorter-and longer-horizon forecasts. In estimates on shorter-horizon data, j = {2,3,4,5,6}
with j=1 being the omitted category; in estimates on longer-horizon data, j = {8,9,10,11,12} with j=7 being the omitted category. Table 1 reports estimates of equation (1) (1); Table 1 reports these Ftests and estimates of the constrained models. (Unconstrained estimates are available upon request.) Specifically, F-tests on the equation (1) estimate using shorter-horizon bond rate 18 Since our dependent variable ranges from zero to one, OLS could give misleading results as it does not impose this restriction. Consequently, we also estimated the models using the quasi-maximum-likelihood estimation method of Papke and Wooldridge (1996 Columns 1.3-1.6 report estimates of equation (1) and about sixty percent do not revise their longer-run forecasts (columns 1.4 and 1.6). Twentyfive-basis-point changes in the actual and target rates reduce Nochange t for shorter-horizon forecasts by 7 and 13 percentage points, respectively, and reduce longer-horizon forecasts by 7 and 9 percentage points, respectively.
Model Estimates for the Full Sample Period
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The last three columns of Table 1 report estimates of equation (1) Specifically with an unchanged unemployment rate, 50% of economists leave their unemployment rate forecasts unrevised 7 to 9 months before the target date whereas only 42% leave forecasts unrevised 10 to 12 months before the target date. A two-standard-deviation change in the unemployment rate reduces both percentages by about 14 percentage points.
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In summary, the evidence in Table 1 reveals three patterns. First, changes in the variables economists forecast reduce the percentages of unrevised forecasts, consistent with state 20 When we include both rate changes in the same model, only the funds rate target change has a significant coefficient in the model estimate using shorter-horizon forecasts while neither rate change has a significant coefficient in the model estimate using longer-horizon forecasts. 21 As noted earlier, the WSJ economists make six forecasts at each survey -three variables and two horizons. To study the possibility that an economist makes joint forecasts, we computed correlation coefficients between pairs of Nochange t measures. We put the hypothesis of state-dependent forecast revisions to a stronger test by exploiting the presence in our sample period of both the end of the Great The heterogeneity in forecast revision behavior documented in Figure 3 may reflect differential rewards to forecast accuracy, leading us to investigate whether recently revised forecasts are more accurate than unrevised forecasts. To test this hypothesis, we compute the squared forecast error for each economist for every target date and horizon and then regress the squared forecast errors on a binary indicator variable coded one if the economist's forecast is unchanged from the prior survey. Only forecasters who responded to both the current and previous surveys are included. Each regression has a sample size of about 50, roughly the average number of economists per survey in our 12-year sample period. Revised forecasts are more often more accurate than unrevised forecasts but the differences are not striking. The disparity in accuracy is greatest for the 10-year bond rate. For the shorter horizons of 1 to 6 months, revised forecasts are significantly more accurate than unrevised forecasts in 35% of the surveys and are significantly less accurate in 3% of the surveys. For the longer horizons of 7 to 12 months, the revised forecasts are significantly more accurate in 17% of the surveys and less accurate in 2% of the surveys. Differences in the accuracy of revised and unrevised fed funds rate and unemployment rate forecasts are smaller.
For the shorter horizons, revised forecasts are significantly more accurate in 17% (fed funds rate) and 15% (unemployment rate) of the surveys and less accurate in 13% and 6%, respectively. For the longer horizons, revisers are more accurate in 14% (fed funds rate) and 10% (unemployment rate) of the surveys and less accurate in 8% and 7%, respectively. For most of the surveys, there is not a statistically significant difference in accuracy between revised and unrevised forecasts. where  is the probability of not revising a forecast and [1/(1-)] is the average time between forecast revisions. We find that the estimated values of their parameter imply s near zero and revision frequencies of slightly more than one month for bond rate forecasts and shorter horizon funds rate forecasts, oftener than the actual revision frequencies of the WSJ forecasters (about twice every three months for bond rate forecasts and about once every three months for the shorter horizon funds rate forecasts). Further, we find that the estimated values of their parameter imply revision frequencies very similar to ours for longer horizon funds rate forecasts and for shorter horizon unemployment rate forecasts (about once every three months and about twice every three months, respectively), but significantly lower revision frequencies for longer horizon unemployment rate forecasts (once every four months versus twice every three months).
The sticky-information model predicts that forecasters will not revise their forecasts when new information arrives if the costs exceed the benefits. This paper contributes to the evidence on sticky information in several ways. First, we test the model using data from the WSJ Economic Forecasting Survey, which publishes the names and forecasts of professional forecasters. From these data we can see precisely when forecasters revise their forecasts and measure rates of forecast revision without making assumptions about forecast rationality, as researchers must do when testing the sticky-information model using datasets without individuals' forecasts. Additionally, the WSJ Survey is monthly, permitting a higher frequency investigation than prior research using quarterly, semi-annual or infrequent surveys. The paper is, to our knowledge, the first to use the WSJ Survey to evaluate the sticky-information model.
Second, we investigate the state dependency of forecast revision frequency by testing whether frequency changes after an increase in the volatility of the variables forecasted. Third, we examine whether forecast revision improves forecast accuracy.
Our results both support the sticky-information model and cast doubt on the model's adequacy as an explanation for the persistence of macro-economic shocks. While we find that many forecasters revise their forecasts only every other month or less frequently, we also find that forecasters revise their estimates more frequently than other researchers have found. Given that our measure of forecast revision frequency is likely a lower bound to the frequency of information updating, our results suggest that frictions other than the costs of acquiring and processing information likely play a role in the responses to economic shocks. Forecasters in the WSJ Survey revise their forecasts of the fed funds rate less frequently than forecasts of the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond rate or the unemployment rate, perhaps due to the timing of FOMC meetings. Forecast horizon appears to exert little influence on the frequency of forecast revision.
Forecasters exhibit considerable heterogeneity in their revision frequencies, consistent with substantial variation in the costs and benefits of revising across forecasters. We find evidence that forecast behavior is state dependent, with forecasters revising their forecasts more frequently in more volatile times. Finally, we find only weak evidence that revising forecasts improves forecast accuracy, particularly at longer horizons. The table reports OLS estimates of the forecast revision model shown for the 2003-2014 sample period. Nochange is the fraction of forecasters in the current WSJ survey with forecasts unchanged from the prior survey. Forecasts are of the 10-year Treasury bond rate, the fed funds rate and the unemployment rate on a target date (30 June or 31 December). Separate estimates are reported for surveys 1-6 months and 7-12 months before the target date. |Δx t-1 | is the absolute change in x from the last business day of the month before the prior survey to the last business day of the month before the current survey; x is the bond rate, the effective fed funds rate, the target fed funds rate and the unemployment rate in columns (1.1)-(1.2), (1.3)-(1.4), (1.5)-(1.6), and (1.7)-(1.9), respectively. D j = 1 if j is the number of months until the forecast target date (30 June or 31 December) and 0 otherwise. D 10+ =1 if the number of months until the forecast target date is 10 or more and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. The F-tests are from unconstrained estimates of the models in which the full set of horizon indicators appear (D j , j={2,...,6} or j={8,…,12}). ** and * denote statistical significance at the 05. and .10 levels, respectively. The table reports OLS estimates of the forecast revision models shown. Forecasts are of the 10-year Treasury bond rate or the unemployment rate on 30 June or 31 December. Separate estimates are reported for surveys 1-6 and 7-12 months before the target date. In Panel A, Nochange is the fraction of forecasters in the current WSJ survey with bond rate forecasts unchanged from the prior survey. |∆i t-1 | is the absolute change in the bond rate from the last business day of the month before the prior survey to the last business day of the month before the current survey. D 1 =1 (D 7 =1) if the number of months until the forecast target date is 1 (7) and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, Nochange is the fraction of forecasters in the current survey with unemployment rate forecasts unchanged from the prior survey. |∆U t-1 | is the absolute change in the unemployment rate from the last business day of the month before the prior survey to the last business day of the month before the current survey. D 10+ =1 if the number of months until the forecast target date is 10 or more and 0 otherwise. In both panels robust standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. This table summarizes statistically significant differences between the mean squared forecast errors of forecasters who did and did not revise their forecasts from the previous survey. For each target date and forecast horizon we first compute the squared forecast error of every economist and then regress the squared forecast errors on a binary indicator variable coded one if the economist's forecast is unchanged from the prior survey. Each regression has a sample size of about 50.
(1-, 5-, 6-, 11-and 12-months-ahead forecasts of some variables are unavailable because the WSJ did not consistently request them. For the fed funds rate, comparisons of forecast accuracy stop after mid-2008 when the Federal Reserve pegged the funds rate target.) Revised forecasts are more (less) accurate if the estimated coefficient of the indicator variable is statistically significant at the 10% level or better and positive (negative). The estimated coefficients are reported in Appendix E in the Supporting Information. The table reports Papke-Woolridge estimates of the forecast revision model shown for the 2003-2014 sample period. Nochange is the fraction of forecasters in the current WSJ survey with forecasts unchanged from the prior survey. Forecasts are of the 10-year Treasury bond rate, the fed funds rate and the unemployment rate on a target date (30 June or 31 December). Separate estimates are reported for surveys 1-6 months and 7-12 months before the target date. |Δx t-1 | is the absolute change in x from the last business day of the month before the prior survey to the last business day of the month before the current survey; x is the bond rate, the effective fed funds rate, the target fed funds rate and the unemployment rate in columns (C.1)-(C.2), (C.3)-(C.4), (C.5)-(C.6), and (C.7)-(C.9), respectively. The table reports SUR estimates of the forecast revision model shown for the 2003-2014 sample period. Nochange is the fraction of forecasters in the current WSJ survey with forecasts unchanged from the prior survey. |Δx t-1 | is the absolute change in x from the last business day of the month before the prior survey to the last business day of the month before the current survey; x is the bond rate, the effective fed funds rate, and the unemployment rate in columns ( 
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Appendix D --continued The table reports SUR estimates of the forecast revision model shown for the 2003-2014 sample period. Nochange is the fraction of forecasters in the current WSJ survey with forecasts unchanged from the prior survey. |Δx t-1 | is the absolute change in x from the last business day of the month before the prior survey to the last business day of the month before the current survey; x is the bond rate, the target fed funds rate and the unemployment rate in columns (D2.1)-(D2.2), (D2.3)-(D2.4), and (D2.5)-(D2.6), respectively. This panel reports differences in the mean squared forecast errors of forecasters who did and did not revise their forecasts of the fed funds rate from the previous survey for the target date shown, by months until the target date. Positive differences indicate larger mean squared errors for non-revisers. The WSJ survey did not request 1-, 6-and 12-months-ahead forecasts of the fed funds rate until June 2008. ***, ** and * indicate differences significantly different from zero at the .01, .05, and .10 levels. † All forecasters revised their forecasts.
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Appendix E--continued Panel A reports estimates of the sticky-information model of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) using the WSJ forecasts where x t+h is the actual value of the variable forecasted h periods ahead and F t x t+h is the average forecast across all forecasters at time t and β =[λ/(1-λ)]. Separate estimates are reported for surveys 1-6 months and 7-12 months before the target date. Standard errors appear in parentheses. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively. F-tests are for unreported model estimates which include dummy variables, permitting different intercepts and slope coefficients by forecast horizon; the F-tests are for the hypothesis that these coefficients are jointly zero. Panel B compares the average number of months between forecast revisions from the CG model estimates in Panel A (computed as [1/(1-λ)]) and the direct measures of forecast revision plotted in Figure  2 . Nochange t is conceptually similar to λ. The average number of months between forecast revisions is 1/(1avg. Nochange) where avg. Nochange is the average value of Nochange for a given variable 1 to 6 months or 7 to 12 months before the target date averaged over all of the surveys in our sample period.
